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Abstract
Most Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) employ exact search for attack
patterns in the analyzed traffic. Because of that, if an attacker introduces
changes in the known attack pattern, the obtained new attack pattern becomes
impossible to detect. To cope with this problem, an IDS can use approximate
search instead of exact search. But then, false positives and false negatives
can appear due to the fact that the type and/or the distribution of changes
to the old attack traffic pattern is not taken into account. In this paper,
we propose a new approximate search algorithm for IDS that introduces
constraints on the numbers of individual change operations on the old attack
traffic patterns. In such a way, we take into account a-priori knowledge about
the type and/or distribution of changes. The experiments show that the false
positive and false negative rates obtained with an IDS using approximate
search with constraints are significantly reduced compared to a system
without constraints. At the same time, the computational cost of introducing
constraints is relatively small.
1 Introduction
Misuse-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) like Snort [1] use exact search to compare
the content of network traffic with a set of known attack signatures. Because of that, the
intrusions, whose signatures are not present in the misuse database cannot be detected.
Approximate search, which allows certain number of errors (k) in the process of finding
the occurrences of the search patterns in the search strings, if applied in an IDS, could
ensure detecting new intrusions that are similar to the previously known ones. However,
false positives and/or false negatives can then be produced since the type and/or the
distribution of the alterations to the original attack traffic pattern (i.e. the total numbers
of insertions, deletions, and substitutions) is not taken into account. By varying the value
of k it is possible to influence the false positive and false negative rates to some extent but
such a regulation is too imprecise and inefficient.
To reduce the numbers of false positives and false negatives when approximate search
is used, we propose introducing certain constraints in the search process. If we know the
probabilities of occurences of particular change/edit operations used to obtain the new
attacks from the old ones, we can define appropriate constraints in approximate search
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and adapt the search algorithm to the particular attack traffic generation process. The
assumption about known probabilities of edit operations is justified by the fact that the
attacker must limit the numbers of particular edit operations on the original attack pattern
since too many individual operations can make behavior of the new attack pattern on
the victim’s system unpredictable (for example, the pattern could become harmless for
the attacked system). The search constraint then limits the total number of occurences of
each particular edit operation (usually deletions, insertions, and substitutions of symbols).
In this paper, we apply the ideas explained above in a constrained Row-Based Bit-
Parallel aproximate search algorithm, CRBP-OpCount, which solves the approximate
search problem with constraints on the maximum allowed numbers of edit operations.
CRBP-OpCount simulates the Non-deterministic Finite Automaton (NFA) assigned to
the search pattern, where the search allows up to k errors. It limits the total numbers
of particular edit operations (deletions, insertions, and substitutions) to the values given
in advance. This simulation is carried out in the Row-wise Bit-Parallel manner, first
introduced by Wu and Manber in [9]. Unlike the algorithm described in [9], we limit the
numbers of specific transitions in the NFA by assigning special counters to its states. This
introduces some computational overhead, but with careful implementation and bearing in
mind the fact that the maximum allowed numbers of edit operations cannot be too large,
as explained above, efficient operation of an IDS implementing such an algorithm can be
ensured and at the same time the false positive and false negative rates in the approximate
search process can be kept under control.
We analyze the outputs of the CRBP-OpCount and the unconstrained approximate
search algorithm (RBP) from [9] in order to compare their performances regarding
efficiency and false positive/false negative rates. The inputs to the search algorithms
(search patterns and search strings) in the experiments are generated from Snort rules.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews related work on
approximate search. Section 3 explains the CRBP-OpCount algorithm. Experimental
setup and the discussion of the experimental results are presented in Section 4 and the
conclusion is given in Section 5.
2 Related Work
Modern fast exact search algorithms exploit so-called bit-parallelism, i.e. the possibility
of encoding the status (active or inactive) of a Non-deterministic Finite Automaton (NFA)
performing the search by means of a single bit of a computer word. Bit-parallelism has
been extensively studied in the last 25 years (see, for example, [4, 7] etc.) The bit-
parallelism technique was first proposed by Baeza-Yates and Gonnet [2] in the context
of exact string matching. Wu and Manber [9] first showed how bit-parallelism could be
used in (unconstrained) approximate search. They exploited bit-parallelism to simulate
an NFA consisting of k rows, which is used in unconstrained approximate search.
In order to improve the efficiency of IDS and ensure their efficient operation at high
data rates, many attempts have been made to speed-up the IDS search algorithm. Bit-
parallelism has been used (see, for example, [5]), but also bit-splitting architectures [8],
dynamic linked lists [3] and other methods. All these algorithms focus on speeding-up
the multi-pattern matching, but they still employ exact search, which means that they are
vulnerable to known attack patterns that were subject to small changes. Thus, evasion of
such an IDS is still relatively easy.
Approximate search in IDS has not been treated extensively in the literature. One
of the attempts to increase the efficiency of IDS search algorithms by employing
unconstrained approximate search is described in [6]. But this approach only considers
insertions of new strings in attack traffic without modifying the existing strings. This
makes our constrained search algorithm approach to intrusion detection a novel one.
3 The CRBP-OpCount Algorithm
The row-wise bit-parallelism (RBP) algorithm [9] served as a starting point in the
development of the CRBP-OpCount algorithm. To exploit bit-parallelism in solving the
constrained approximate search problem, where the constraints are on the total numbers
of elementary edit operations (insertions, deletions, and substitutions), we apply these
constraints on each active state of the NFA assigned to the search pattern before making
a transition to the next state. We illustrate this process on an example (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: NFA assigned to the search pattern ”threat”, allowing up to 2 character insertions, deletions, or
substitutions (see text)
The NFA from Fig. 1 is assigned to the search pattern ”threat” that allows up to 2
errors in constrained search. The 0th row of the NFA corresponds to exact search, the
1st row allows 1 error, and the 2nd row allows 2 errors. The nodes Ri j in the NFA are
called states, where R00 with a self loop is the initial state and the states with a double
circle are terminal states. Each state contains a status bit D (that indicates whether the
state is active or inactive, where active means that the state can be reached from other
state(s) for a given input symbol) and a constraint bufferC, which contains triplets [I,E,S]
of elementary edit operations that are allowed for the transitions from the state Ri j (I
insertions, E erasures/deletions, and S substitutions). The arrows in the NFA represent
transitions: a horizontal arrow for an input symbol match, a vertical arrow for an insertion,
a dashed-diagonal arrow for a deletion, and a solid-diagonal arrow for a substitution. For
example, if there is a possibility of a substitution transition from the state R01 to the
state R12, the constraint value on the number of maximum permitted substitutions S is
checked at the state R01 (the value S is contained in the constraint buffer R01.C). If the
constraint value S is greater than 0 then the substitution transition is allowed from R01
to R12, otherwise the transition is not performed. In case of a successful substitution
transition, the corresponding constraint value S is decreased by 1 for the state R12 and this
state is made active (i.e. R12.D= 1, R12.C.S= R01.C.S−1). Similarly, the corresponding
constraint values are checked for the deletion and insertion transitions. This process
continues until all the input symbols of the search string are fed into the NFA. We say
there is an occurrence of a search pattern in the search string at the position pos, if the
NFA can reach one of the terminal states after receiving an input symbol.
Algorithm 1 applies the concepts introduced above. We now explain its details. The
parameter P is a search pattern of lengthm, T is a search string of length n, and con[I,E,S]
is a constraint on the maximum number of permitted insertions (I), deletions (E), and
Algorithm 1 CRBP-OpCount
1: procedure CRBP-OPCOUNT(P, T , con)
2: Input parameters:
3: P= p1p2...pm - search pattern,
4: T = t1t2...tn - search string
5: con= [I,E,S] - constraints on total numbers of edit operations
6: k - maximum number of errors
7: k = I+E+ S
8: Preprocessing - defining bit masks
9: For all characters c from the alphabet Σ, bit mask B[c]← 0m
10: Then for all c in P:
11: for i ∈ 1...m do
12: if pi = c then B[c]← B[c] | 0m−i10i−1
13: Below, we count bits from the right (LSB= 1, MSB= m)
14: Preprocessing - initializing the NFA
15: for i ∈ 0...k do
16: Ri.Dj ← 1, j = 1, . . . , i
17: for all j such that Ri.Dj = 1 do
18: Ri.Cj = ∪Ri−1.Cj, with I, E , S reduced by 1 at a time
19: Processing of input symbols
20: for pos ∈ 1...n do
21: R
′
0.D← ((R0.D<<1) | 0m−11)&B[tpos]
22: for all j such that R′0.Dj = 1 do
23: R
′
0.Cj = con
24: for i ∈ 1...k do
25: for all j > 1 do
26: match.Dj ← Ri.Dj−1&B[tpos] j
27: if match.Dj = 1 thenmatch.Cj ← Ri.Cj−1
28: if Ri−1.Cj.I > 0 then
29: ins.Dj ← Ri−1.Dj
30: if ins.Dj = 1 then
31: newC ← Ri−1.Cj
32: newC.I ← newC.I− 1
33: ins.Cj ← newC
34: if Ri−1.Cj−1.S > 0 then
35: sub.Dj ← Ri−1.Dj−1
36: if sub.Dj = 1 then
37: newC ← Ri−1.Cj−1
38: newC.S ← newC.S− 1
39: sub.Cj ← newC
40: if R′i−1.Cj−1.E > 0 then
41: del.Dj ← R′i−1.Dj−1
42: if del.Dj = 1 then
43: newC ← R′i−1.Cj−1
44: newC.E ← newC.E− 1
45: del.Cj ← newC
46: R
′
i.D←match.D | ins.D | sub.D | del.D | 0m−11
47: R
′
i.C ←match.C∪ ins.C∪ sub.C∪del.C
48: if R′i.D&10m−1 = 0m then report an occurrence at pos
substitutions (S) to find the occurrences of a search pattern in the search string. Obviously,
the total number of allowed errors k is equal to the sum of the constraints on I, E, and S.
The bit-mask B[c] = bm . . .b1 is computed for all the characters c of the search pattern
P such that the jth bit is set to 1 if the jth character of the pattern P is the same as the
character c. For characters other than the characters contained in the search pattern the bit
masks B[∗] are equal to 0. This is a usual procedure for any bit-parallel search algorithm
on strings, see for example [7].
Preprocessing is performed for all the rows Ri of the automaton, i = 0 . . .k. We set i
starting bits to 1 for all Ri and to all the active bits of Ri, we assign a set of constraintsC in
such a way that the constraints on I, E, and S decrease by 1 at a time from the constraints
from the previous row. Note that the constraint value of I, E, or S must be greater than 0
in order to assign it to a state. For R1, the previous constraint array is always con[I,E,S].
Note that the set union removes the duplicate constraints. We illustrate preprocessing on
an example. If con[I,E,S] = [0,2,1] then preprocessing for each row will be as given
below:
R1.C = {[0,1,1], [0,2,0]} for 1st active state
R2.C = {[0,0,1], [0,1,0]} for 1st and 2nd active states
R3.C = {[0,0,0]} for 1st , 2nd and 3rd active states.
For each input symbol from the search string, we run the row-wise NFA simulation
cycle following approximately the lines from [9] (see Fig. 1), but at the same time we
apply the constraints on all the active states of each row.
Since the 0th row of the automaton indicates exact search (with 0 errors), all the active
states in this row are assigned the constraint con[I,E,S]. Rows, whose ordinal numbers
are greater than 0 indicate the numbers of errors, which can be insertion, deletion,
or substitution errors. For all the active states in each such row, we need to modify
the constraint values depending on the type of error. For a symbol match (horizontal
transition), the constraint value from the previous state is copied to the current active
state. For an insertion error (vertical transition), the constraint set C of the state in the
same column from the previous row, updated at processing of the previous input symbol
is checked. If it has the allowed number of insertion errors (i.e. more than 0) then the
insertion transition is allowed and we reduce the corresponding constraint value(s) by 1
and store the whole constraint C as a new constraint for the current active state. In the
case of a substitution error (solid-diagonal transition), the constraint set C of the state in
the previous column from the previous row, updated at processing of the previous input
character is checked. If it has the allowed number of substitution errors (i.e. more than
0) then the substitution transition is allowed. The constraint value(s) for the substitution
is reduced by 1 and stored as a new constraint C for the current active state. Finally, in
the case of a deletion error (dashed-diagonal transition), the constraint set C of the state
in the previous column from the previous row, updated at processing of the current input
character is checked. If it has the allowed number of deletion errors (i.e. more than 0)
then we allow the deletion transition, reduce the constraint value(s) by 1, and store the
whole constraint C as a new constraint for the current active state. We change the status
of a state to inactive if any of these transitions was not performed due to the constraints.
We execute the operations described above until all the input symbols from the search
string are fed into the automaton. We say there is an occurrence of a search pattern in the
search string if the last state bit of at least one row is equal to 1 (i.e. the corresponding
state is active). For example, if the last bit of the row R3 is active then we say there is
an occurrence with 3 errors. In order to check the number of insertions, deletions, or
substitutions used until that occurrence, the constraint set C can be checked at the active
state.
4 Experimental Work
Experimental setup
We performed an experiment in order to compare the false positive rates and time
efficiency of the CRBP-OpCount algorithm and the unconstrained approximate RBP
search algorithm from [9]. This has been done by simulating the algorithms in an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-4600U CPU @ 2.10 GHz 2.70 GHz laptop with 8 GB installed memory
(RAM) and by analyzing their outputs. In the experiment, we first created the search
patterns and search strings based on selected Snort rules and then we fed them into the
CRBP-OpCount and the unconstrained RBP algorithms. These two algorithms tried to
find the occurrences of each search pattern in all the search strings and generated the
outputs. Details about these procedures are explained below.
For the experiment, the Snort version 2.9.6 was installed together with the
corresponding rules available to the registered users. There were 73 different categories
of rules, where the categorization is based on the attack types. We selected only one
of these categories, backdoor.rules, in which many rules contain one or more so-
called ”content” fields, whose presence indicates activation of the Snort exact search
algorithm at processing the corresponding traffic. It is possible to use any other rule
category if testing the rules from that category in Snort activates the same search
algorithm. To demonstrate the capabilities of approximate search algorithms, with or
without constraints, we extracted the search patterns of the ”content” option keywords in
the rules contained in the backdoor.rules file and used them to create search patterns
and search strings for the experiment. For example, one of the rules present in the
backdoor.rules file is given below:
alert tcp $HOME_NET 16959 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg: ”BACKDOOR subseven
DEFCON8 2.1 access”; flow: from_server, established; content: ”PWD”; classtype:
trojan-activity; sid:107; rev:6;)
From this rule, the ”content” field string ”PWD” would be extracted for the experiment
and then distorted by applying insertions, deletions, and substitutions of characters. It was
then supposed that traffic containing a string distorted in this way was sent to the victim
running Snort and the same rule applied to such traffic pattern would not trigger. The
experiment would then test approximate search algorithms, with and without constraints,
on the distorted search string instead of the original Snort exact search algorithm.
The patterns associated to the ”content” keywords of the rules contained in the file
backdoor.rules were extracted in a text file in such a way that the duplicate patterns
were eliminated and each pattern occupied one line in the text file. Some of the extracted
patterns contained a mix of text and hexadecimal numbers such as BN|10 00 02 00|, or
Remote|3A| You are connected to me. Because of that, it was necessary to convert
all the extracted text to hexadecimal numbers. We converted all the text that was not
enclosed within the pipe (|) characters to the hexadecimal numbers since the hexadecimal
numbers were enclosed within the pipe characters in the extracted patterns. Finally, spaces
were removed from the extracted patterns. After completing all these pre-processing
actions, we obtained total of 61 search patterns for the experiment.
Search strings in our experiment were the strings that contained errors introduced
by applying individual edit operations on the previously extracted search patterns. We
introduced four different sets of errors on all the search strings in order to get four
different sets of distorted search strings: i) 5% insertions, 5% substitutions; ii) 10%
deletions, 5% substitutions; iii) 10% deletions, 10% substitutions, and iv) 10% deletions,
and 20% substitutions. We created four different sets of search strings in order to test
the search algorithms with different sets of errors. Here, every search pattern had at least
one occurrence in the list of distorted search strings and each search string was created
with different constraints con[I,E,S] depending on the corresponding error sets. We also
removed search strings shorter than or equal to 3 hexadecimal numbers. After removing
all the short search strings, we obtained total of 52 search strings in each set.
The CRBP-OpCount and the unconstrained RBP algorithms take the search patterns
and the search strings as inputs and try to find the occurrences of the search patterns in the
list of search strings. The CRBP-OpCount handles constraints on the maximum numbers
of individual edit operations and RBP handles only the maximum number of errors k (i.e.,
k = #insertions+#deletions+#substitutions) while performing the approximate search.
The implementations of the CRBP-OpCount and the RBP algorithms were capable of
processing hexadecimal numbers instead of characters after a little modification.
The outputs of the CRBP-OpCount and the RBP approximate search algorithms in
our experiment include the numbers of occurrences of 61 different search patterns in the
list of 52 search strings for four different sets of errors introduced in the search strings.
We created four cases to group the outputs of the CRBP-OpCount and the RBP for the
analysis:
• CaseA includes: distorted search strings generated by the first set of errors (5%
insertions and 5% substitutions); CRBP-OpCount with 5% deletions and 5%
substitutions; CRBP-Opcount with 5% deletions and 10% substitutions; RBP with
10% error tolerance level; RBP with 15% error tolerance level.
• CaseB includes: distorted search strings generated by the second set of errors
(10% deletions and 5% substitutions); CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions and
5% substitutions; CRBP-Opcount with 10% insertions and 10% substitutions; RBP
with 15% error tolerance level; RBP with 20% error tolerance level.
• CaseC includes: distorted search strings generated by the third set of errors (10%
deletions and 10% substitutions); CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions and 10%
substitutions; CRBP-Opcount with 10% insertions and 15% substitutions; RBP
with 20% error tolerance level; RBP with 25% error tolerance level.
• CaseD includes: distorted search strings generated by the fourth set of errors (10%
deletions and 20% substitutions); CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions and 20%
substitutions; CRBP-Opcount with 15% insertions and 20% substitutions; RBP
with 30% error tolerance level; RBP with 35% error tolerance level.
In each case, the CRBP-OpCount and the RBP search algorithms were executed two
times; one with the number of errors that were used to generate the distorted search
strings, and other with small deviations. For example, in CaseA, the total number of
errors introduced was 10%. Therefore, RBP with 10% and 15% error tolerance levels
were used. Since the distorted search strings for CaseA were generated with 5% insertions
and 5% substitutions, CRBP-OpCount with 5% deletions and 5% substitutions, and
CRBP-OpCount with 5% deletions and 10% substitutions (small deviation from the actual
constraints) error constraints were used. The constraints on edit operations and the error
tolerances were chosen in such a way that the algorithms would generate at least one
occurrence of each distorted search string.
Results and discussion
The output Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the false positives and false negatives generated
by the CRBP-OpCount and the RBP search algorithms for CaseA, CaseB, CaseC, and
CaseD, respectively. The search patterns that are listed in these tables are the strings that
had more than 1 occurrence or no match in one of the outputs of each case. Other search
patterns generated only one occurrence, which was not useful to analyze the numbers of
false positives and false negatives in the outputs. Therefore, they are not included in the
tables. The ”Total” in the Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 is the total number of occurrences of the
search patterns, ”Search Patterns (N)” is the number of search patterns available in the
tables, ”False Negative (FN)” is the number of search patterns that were not matched in
the search strings, and ”False Positive (FP)” is the number of reported occurrences, which
were not present in reality and it is given by FP= Total+FN−N.
Table 1: Selected outputs for CaseA (CRBP-OpCount with 5% deletions (E) and 5% substitutions (S),
CRBP-OpCount with 5% deletions (E) and 10% substitutions (S), RBP with 10% errors, and RBP with
15% errors in the search strings (FP - False Positives; FN - False Negatives))
SN Search Patterns CRBP-OpCount RBP 10% RBP 15%
E=5%, S=5% E=5%, S=10%
1 424e10000200 2 2 2 2
2 436f6e6e65637465642e 1 1 2 4
3 686f7374 4 4 2 2
4 70494e67 2 2 1 1
5 7068417365 2 2 1 1
6 72303074 3 3 3 3
7 72657774 3 3 1 1
8 424e000200 2 2 2 2
9 636f6e6e6563746564 3 3 4 4
10 636c69656e74 2 2 2 2
Total 26 26 21 23
Search patterns (N) 10
FN 0 0 0 0
FP = Total + FN - N 16 16 11 13
Table 2: Selected outputs for CaseB (CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions (I) and 5% substitutions (S),
CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions (I) and 10% substitutions (S), RBP with 15% errors, and RBP with
20% errors in the search strings (FP - False Positives; FN - False Negatives))
SN Search Patterns CRBP-OpCount RBP 15% RBP 20%
I=10%, S=5% I=10%, S=10%
1 436f6e6e656374652e 1 1 5 5
2 0B000000070000436f6e656326 1 1 1
3 686f7374 1 1 2 2
4 72303074 2 2 3 3
5 76657273696e3A474f4c322e76 1 1 1
6 424e000200 2 2 2 2
7 636f6e6e65637464 3 3 5 5
8 636c696574 2 2 2 2
Total Matches 13 13 19 21
Search patterns (N) 8
FN 0 0 2 0
FP = Total Matches + FN - N 5 5 13 13
Table 3: Selected outputs for CaseC (CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions (I) and 10% substitutions (S),
CRBP-OpCount with 15% insertions (I) and 10% substitutions, RBP with 20% errors, and RBP with 25%
errors in the search strings (FP - False Positives; FN - False Negatives))
SN Search Patterns CRBP-OpCount RBP 20% RBP 25%
I=10%, S=10% I=10%, S=15%
1 4e65744261 1 1 1 3
2 424e100061 1 1 2
3 436f6e6e6563746561 1 1 5 5
4 0B000000076100436f6e656174 1 1 1
5 3200000006006102447269767
36100
1 1 1
6 52656d6f74653A31756172656
36f6e3163746564746d6531
1 1 1
7 686f7374 1 1 1 2
8 4654504f4e 1 1 1 2
9 7068417365 1 1 1 3
10 72303074 2 2 3 3
11 7768303042 1 1 1 2
12 7665727369513A474f4c325131 1 1 1
13 424e000200 2 2 2 2
14 636f6e6e65637451 3 3 5 5
15 636c696551 2 2 2 2
Total 20 20 23 35
Search patterns (N) 15
FN 0 0 4 0
FP = Total + FN - N 5 5 12 20
Table 4: Selected outputs for CaseD (CRBP-OpCount with 10% insertions (I) and 20% substitutions (S),
CRBP-OpCount with 15% insertions (I) and 20% substitutions (S), RBP with 30% errors, and RBP with
35% errors in the search strings (FP - False Positives; FN - False Negatives))
SN Search Patterns CRBP-OpCount RBP 30% RBP 35%
I=10%, S=20% I=15%, S=20%
1 4e65744271 1 1 3 3
2 424e100071 1 1 2 2
3 436f6e6e3563746535 1 1 5 5
4 0B00000035000043356e656335 1 1 1
5 686f7352 1 1 6 6
6 47697252 1 1 2 2
7 70494e6a 1 1 2 2
8 4654504f6a 1 1 2 2
9 72303040 2 2 6 6
10 72657740 1 1 4 4
11 7768303079 1 1 2 2
12 77616e79 1 1 3 3
13 766572736d6e3A476d4c322e6d 1 1 1
14 424e00026d 2 2 2 2
15 636f6e6d65637464 3 4 5 5
16 636c69656d 2 2 2 2
Total 21 22 46 48
Search patterns (N) 16
FN 0 0 2 0
FP = Total + FN - N 5 6 32 32
From the Tables 2, 3, and 4, we can see that the RBP algorithm can generate false
negatives (no occurrence of search patterns) if the error tolerance level (k) is not chosen
properly. The false negatives can be reduced by increasing the k but it may result in
a greater number of false positives than with lower k. This is also true for the CRBP-
OpCount algorithm. The Tables 2, 3, and 4 also show that the CRBP-OpCount algorithm
is able to generate lower number of false positives compared to the RBP. It is because
the CRBP-OpCount search algorithm can limit the number of constraints on specific edit
operations, which is not possible in the case of the RBP unconstrained approximate search
algorithm.
Fig. 2 shows the plots for the false positives obtained by the CRBP-OpCount1, CRBP-
OpCount2, RBP1, and RBP2 algorithms in each case. CRBP-OpCount1 is a CRBP-
OpCount algorithm with constraints on 5% deletions and 5% substitutions in CaseA,
10% insertions and 5% substitutions in CaseB, 10% insertions and 10% substitutions in
CaseC, and 10% insertions and 20% substitutions in CaseD. CRBP-OpCount2 is a CRBP-
OpCount algorithm with constraints on 5% deletions and 10% substitutions in CaseA,
10% insertions and 10% substitutions in CaseB, 10% insertions and 15% substitutions in
CaseC, and 15% insertions and 20% substitutions in CaseD. RBP1 is a RBP algorithm
with 10% error tolerance level in CaseA, 15% error tolerance level in CaseB, 20% error
tolerance level in CaseC, and 30% error tolerance level in CaseD. RBP2 is the RBP
with 15% error tolerance level in CaseA, 20% error tolerance level in CaseB, 25% error
tolerance level in CaseC, and 35% error tolerance level in CaseD.
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Fig. 2: Number of false positives obtained by the CRBP-OpCount1, CRBP-OpCount2, RBP1, and RBP2
approximate search algorithms in CaseA, CaseB, CaseC, and CaseD.
The plots for the execution time taken by the CRBP-OpCount1, CRBP-OpCount2,
RBP1, and RBP2 algorithms are provided in Fig. 3. These are the execution times taken
by each algorithm for matching 61 search patterns with 52 distorted search strings. It
shows that there is not much difference in the execution time of the CRBP-OpCount and
the RBP search algorithms for a lower number of errors. However, the execution time
has been increased for the larger numbers of errors. The rate of increase in the execution
time is higher in the case of the CRBP-OpCount algorithm than the RBP unconstrained
approximate search algorithm.
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Fig. 3: Execution times taken by the CRBP-OpCount1, CRBP-OpCount2, RBP1, and RBP2 algorithms for
matching 61 search patterns and 52 distorted search strings.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a constrained approximate search algorithm for application in
misuse-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The algorithm introduces constraints
on the individual numbers of change/edit operations in order to take into account a-
priori knowledge about the habits of the attackers and the algorithms that they use when
they transform the known attack patterns in order to pass unnoticed by the IDS. The
use of a-priori knowledge about attackers is justified by the fact that it is not possible
to apply just any change on the known attack traffic pattern in order to obtain a new
attack. The attacker must limit the number of edit operations in this process otherwise
the produced traffic might behave in an unpredictable way (for example, it might not be
harmful at all). With the constraints incorporated in the approximate search algorithm,
we managed to reduce the numbers of false positives and false negatives generated by the
IDS significantly compared to the case when an approximate search algorithm without
constraints was used on the same input data. In addition, by using bit-parallelism inherent
to commonly used computers in the constrained approximate search algorithm together
with a set of counters of allowed individual edit operations assigned to each state bit of
the simulated NFA, we managed to keep the execution time needed to detect intrusions at
a level low enough for efficient operation of the IDS, especially for the lower error rates.
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